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vABSTRACT 
Practitioners and scholars have sought to enhance their understanding of how 
to end civil wars through negotiations, as these conflicts have become increasingly 
common since WWII. This study argues that mediators might use their resources or 
influence to incentivize or coerce the warring sides to consider negotiated resolution. 
The concept of an incentive-based mediation strategy suggests mediators can put “skin 
in the game” to facilitate negotiation or settlement. Statistical analysis 
demonstrates that inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, are 
more likely to use these incentive strategies and that mediators use these strategies in 
countries considered neither democracies nor autocracies. These findings can inform 
policymakers how to leverage power and capability to facilitate negotiations in 
seemingly intractable civil war conflicts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After nearly 10 years of fighting in Afghanistan, members of the international 
community—who invested in the conflict’s outcome after 9/11—in 2011 began to 
explore the potential for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the Afghan 
government and the Taliban (Gall & Khapalwak, 2011). With prospects fading for a 
decisive government victory over the Taliban, members of the international coalition 
fighting in Afghanistan began efforts to promote a negotiated settlement among the 
warring factions (Khan, 2015; Koelbl & Stark, 2011; Koranyi, 2013). Four years after 
they began, these efforts have borne little fruit. The rise of the Islamic State in the Middle 
East and a more internationally active Russia has shifted international attention from 
Afghanistan as the coalition downsizes its military presence. To revivify negotiations, 
members of the international coalition might consider using their considerable leverage to 
incentivize the sides. By increasing or decreasing their military presence or financial 
contributions to Afghanistan, outside actors have the opportunity to change the status quo 
and pressure the sides to consider negotiating. Before making such an offer, outside 
actors would need to overcome their fear that such actions would lead to more short-term 
violence and diminish their influence in the country (Raghavan, 2015). 
The challenges faced by the third parties attempting to mediate this conflict are 
not unique to Afghanistan. Potential mediators in many civil wars since 1946 have been 
rebuffed by the warring parties, who favored the pursuit of outright military victory over 
negotiation and compromise. This thesis suggests that third-party mediators could use 
their leverage—whether military or financial—to encourage the sides in a civil war to 
consider negotiation rather than continued fighting. This thesis builds on the existing 
scholarship on civil war mediation that has proliferated since the end of the Cold War. It 
uses recently developed data sources to look anew at how third-party mediators use their 
resources and capabilities to mediate civil wars, and it expands the current understanding 
of how mediators use their resources to encourage negotiation or settlement. This thesis 
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focuses on offers made by mediators to further negotiations, which might include 
starting, restarting, or advancing negotiations, or finalizing a settlement.1 
Previous scholarship on civil war mediation has focused on mediators’ strategies 
within the context of the negotiation and how mediators might influence the negotiation 
process (Bercovitch, 1996; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Gartner, 2011; Regan, Frank, & 
Aydin, 2009). It has yet to explore fully when and why a mediator might put its own 
“skin in the game,” and commit its own resources—not simply deploy its military to 
support one of the warring sides—to an external territory in conflict (Touval, 1975). The 
focus of this thesis is to define circumstances that might lead a civil war mediator to 
commit its own resources to facilitate continued negotiation or a final settlement. The 
current research draws on the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset2 and points to the 
hypothesis that mediators (i) possess the capability to influence warring factions’ 
decisionmaking by offering their own resources as enticements or coercion, (ii) can use 
both positive and negative levers to influence the negotiating sides, and (iii) must have 
both the capacity and incentive to consider such a strategy. 
A. MEDIATION IN CIVIL WAR 
The study of international mediation in civil war has rapidly expanded in the 
years after the Cold War, as researchers have sought to understand the variables 
associated with political settlement (Bercovitch, 1996; Stedman, 1991; Walter, 1997; 
Zartman, 1989). Researchers have defined mediation in many ways. This thesis uses 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille’s definition: “a process of conflict management, 
related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, whereby the disputing parties or their 
representatives seek the assistance, or accept an individual, group, state or organization’s 
                                                 
1 This thesis uses references to restarting, furthering, or finalizing negotiations interchangeably, each 
referring to the mediator’s intent to use its capabilities for potential negotiation and not for the outright 
military victory of one of the warring sides. 
2 The CWM dataset focuses exclusively on civil war mediation events. Its data include events and 
relevant technical details from 1946 to 2004 (DeRouen, Bercovitch, & Pospieszna, 2011). Its details 
include the territory, warring sides, conflict duration, mediation episodes, and the mediators involved. This 
author was provided a more current dataset by the CWM’s authors for this analysis. The analysis in this 
thesis uses new research based on the updated CWM data set to examine mediators’ use of incentives to 
affect negotiation, whether positively or negatively. 
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offer to help change, affect, or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting 
to physical force, or invoking the authority of the law” (1991, p. 8). Many scholars of 
international mediation use this definition, and because this thesis builds upon their 
research, using the same definition herein maintains consistency. This definition 
precludes the mediator from invoking legal and military power to coerce an agreement; 
the mediator can attempt only to influence the combatants through non-coercive means. 
The definition can also be applied to business and legal mediation, in addition to 
international civil war mediation. These three mediation fields face similar challenges, 
and drawing on the research in each can inform policymaking and research across the 
disciplines. In business, the mediator asserts no direct power over the parties in conflict, 
and derives power from each side’s acceptance of the mediator in that capacity. 
Similarly, in civil war mediation, the mediator “does not have authority to impose an 
outcome” (Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001, p. 375) even if the mediator has its own 
motivations for becoming involved or trying to reach a resolution. One significant 
difference in the mediation fields is that, unlike in the business or legal worlds, arbitration 
is not an option for international mediation (Cheldelin, Druckman, & Fast, 2008, p. 280; 
Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, & Squintani, 2009). Thus, if mediation in a civil war fails, the 
sides are likely to return to violence (Destradi & Vüllers, 2012). In short, an actor agrees 
to mediate a civil war with no power to compel the sides to any action or agreement, and 
both warring sides must voluntarily accept the third party as a mediator. 
There have been at least 25 active civil wars in each calendar year since the mid-
1970s (Roser, 2015).3 Scholars are divided on the causes of civil war. Some argue that 
civil wars begin because the population does not feel represented by the government, 
leading to grievances (Buhaug, Cederman, & Rød, 2008; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 
2010). Other scholars suggest civil wars start because the state is weak and cannot 
suppress or counter its internal opposition (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). By the time a 
mediator becomes involved in a conflict—when the conflict is ripe for mediation—each 
side has almost assuredly committed acts that lead to additional grievances on both sides, 
                                                 
3 The data source defined a civil war as an intrastate conflict between a government and a non-
government actor where 1,000 battle deaths occurred in the given year (Roser, 2015). 
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which further sustains the animosity between the warring sides (Zartman, 1989). The 
mediator must address both the grievances that led to the civil war’s start and the 
grievances that have manifested because of it. The latter generally include human rights 
abuses, exploitation of the population, or economic unbalance, among others. The 
difficulties in helping the warring parties overcome both their initial grievances and 
subsequent consequences of conflict is significant, and contributes to the conclusion that 
civil wars are less likely than interstate wars to be settled through mediation (Walter, 
1997, 2002). 
A mediator’s motivation in facilitating a negotiated settlement is often tied to the 
mediator’s own interests in the conflict’s outcome (Melin & Svensonn, 2009). For 
example, the mediator may have a special historical relationship with the territory (it 
might be a former colonial power, for example), sympathize with one of the sides in the 
conflict, or judge that the conflict risks causing further instability (Greig & Regan, 2008). 
Acting upon their interests to become a mediator poses risks. Should the negotiation fail, 
the mediator might suffer damage to its international reputation. It is important for a 
mediator to clearly understand its own motives in agreeing to intervene, as these 
motivations will foreshadow how deeply a mediator might invest in the negotiation 
process (Regan, 2010). 
Scholars should view a mediator’s efforts in the context of the mediator’s goals. 
This perspective is the most useful because different types of mediators and their 
proximity to the conflict may dictate the interests that inspire them to consider 
intervening. Some mediators might seek to mediate because of their self-interest, as to 
support their preferred outcome. For example, as the world’s hegemon, the United States 
has interest in maintaining its preeminent role, while states such as Russia or China might 
seek to mediate a civil war to disrupt the United States’ position and enhance their 
country’s prestige. Some studies suggest biased mediators, particularly those that favor 
the government, are more successful civil war mediators (Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2007). 
Biased third parties might use more costly mediation strategies to ensure that the conflicts 
reach the mediator’s preferred settlement. The United States may mediate a conflict to 
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preserve or promote democratic values. A third party probably will be motivated by its 
goals and interests when considering whether to mediate a civil war conflict. 
Mediation is both risky and costly to the mediator, suggesting that mediators will 
become involved only when no other solution appears feasible: mediation occurs only in 
the most intractable of conflicts (Beardsley, 2011; Gartner, 2013). This selection effect 
may cause mediation to appear less successful because intractable and complex conflicts 
are, by definition, those that have withstood resolution by any means other than open 
warfare (Gartner, 2013; Svensson, 2006). Were each side’s grievances minor, only 
narrowly held, or if one side had a distinct military advantage, the conflict could be 
resolved more easily, perhaps without outside mediation. When injecting themselves into 
a conflict as a mediator, an outside actor must be prepared to accept the risks and costs 
when they asses that intervention will address their own strategic interests. 
B. IDENTIFYING A CONFLICT’S RIPENESS FOR RESOLUTION 
To be successful, a primary condition for mediation is that both sides in a civil 
war accept the third party—a generally independent outside actor that is not one of the 
main parties involved in the conflict—as the mediator (Moore, 2014). Mediation occurs 
when “both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator” (Frei, 1976, 
p. 69). The warring sides must accept the third party because the third party has no over-
arching authority to impose its will in the conflict. Thus, the warring sides can walk away 
from negotiations if they are dissatisfied with the mediation process. The mediator’s 
potential interest in and entrance into the conflict will cause each side to consider the 
costs and benefits of accepting mediation (Mitchell, 1995). The warring factions can 
more easily evaluate a mediator if they know the mediator’s preferences and how those 
preferences affect each side’s incentives when considering negotiations (Clayton, 2013; 
Gent, 2011; Melin & Svensson, 2009; Mitchell, 1995).  
C. REVIEWING MEDIATION STRATEGIES 
Mediators’ involvement in civil wars varies in intensity, and the various strategies 
require introduction (Bercovitch et al., 1991). The least intense mediator strategy is a 
communication-facilitation strategy, where the mediator serves as a go-between, 
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conveying information between the parties and ensuring the sides understand each other’s 
statements, offers, and messages (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Using this strategy, the 
mediator tries to develop confidence and trust between the two sides (Bercovitch & 
Houston, 2000). A more intense strategy, called a procedural strategy, is when the 
mediator accepts additional burdens in the mediation process and asserts more control 
over the negotiation’s structural aspects, such as retaining the power to set the agenda or 
negotiating parameters (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Watkins, 2003). The next most 
intense mediation strategy is a directive strategy, where a mediator provides incentives, 
and costs, within the negotiation (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Put another way: 
Directive strategies are identified as the “strategies by which the mediator 
actively promotes a specific solution or attempts to pressure or manipulate 
the parties directly into ending the dispute.” They involve such tactics as 
making specific proposals, pressing the parties to make concessions, 
suggesting particular settlements, emphasizing the costs of disagreement, 
threatening to withdraw, arguing each party’s case to the other, and trying 
to change the parties’ expectations. (Bercovitch & Wells, 1993, p. 6) 
In a directive strategy, the mediator uses its power to direct the warring sides in 
the negotiation. Previous research suggests directive strategies are the most effective 
form of mediation (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003; Gartner, 2014a). The different mediation 
strategies and their relative intensity are illustrated in Figure 1. More intense mediation 
strategies almost always leverage less intense mediation strategies simultaneously to 
maximize potential gains. This is illustrated by the least intense mediation strategy, 
communications-facilitation, forming Figure 1’s foundation. Some mediation techniques 
may not be exclusive to one category and may span across different strategies. For 
example, a mediator might use shuttle diplomacy to narrow the communications gap 
between the two sides—a communications-facilitation strategy—while also attempting to 
persuade one side to accept an offer—an aspect of a directive strategy. This demonstrates 
how more intense mediation strategies may interact with those of lesser intensity. 
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This analysis will examine the aspects of directive strategies that require the 
mediator to use its power and resources to change the warring parties’ perceptions; what 
this analysis terms incentive strategies. Incentive strategies constitute a subset of broader 
directive strategies and require the mediator to spend or withdraw its own resources as 
part of a mediation effort, and not simply to help the negotiation process.4 As Figure 1 
suggests, incentive strategies are the most intense mediation strategies. 
As suggested in Figure 2, at the outset of a conflict, the government side is 
typically stronger and prefers fighting over negotiation because negotiation with the 
enemy conveys legitimacy and equal status to the side seeking to undermine the state. As 
the conflict continues, the government may become more amenable to negotiation if its 
influence or strength wanes (Zartman, 1989). Conversely, the opposition would welcome 
negotiations at the outset, but the longer a conflict goes on, the more confident it might be 
that it can militarily defeat the government. As the conflict continues, each side’s interest 
in negotiation will increase or decrease depending on how each perceives the trajectory 
of the conflict, whether it is in their favor or not. Their interest in negotiation is generally 
                                                 
4 Other aspects of directive strategies include promoting a specific solution, applying pressure, or 
urging the parties to make concessions (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Unlike incentive strategies, these 
strategies do not require a mediator to take on actual costs as part of a negotiation. 
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inversely related to their perception of their battlefield prospects: if they perceive they are 
winning militarily, they are less likely to negotiate. This is represented by the points at 
the bottom of each side’s curve in Figure 2. The conflict must be at a certain point for 
both sides to meaningfully commit to negotiations, probably only after a period of 
fighting (Zartman, 1989). The sides are likely to have more interest in negotiation when 
there is a reversal of fortunes, when the side that previously perceived that it was winning 
perceives a change in the battlefield and the weaker side that is militarily ascendant, but 
not dominant, is willing to contemplate negotiations because of recent military success 
(Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). The point of ripeness, where negotiations can begin, is 
represented by the points of intersection in Figure 2. For example, the Balkan crisis only 
reached a political conclusion after the Serbs met several battlefield defeats that caused 
them to consider resolving the conflict through negotiation (Magaš & Žanić, 2001). 
Figure 2.  Warring Sides’ Level of Interest in Negotiation as Related  
to Conflict Duration 
 
Even after negotiations begin, looming violence is a constant threat to 
negotiations. The mediator must not only prevent the sides from walking away from 
negotiations, but also encourage the sides to invest sufficiently in the negotiation to, 
ultimately, make compromises with their previous enemy (Walter, 1997). Belligerent 
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factions of each side constantly threaten to derail negotiations. Each side is rarely so 
unified and cohesive as to allow its negotiators to act without extensive consensus 
building and persuasion among their own side—certain elements will disagree with the 
decision to negotiate (De Zeeuw, 2008; Stedman, 1991, 1997). Spoilers are “leaders and 
parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, 
worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” 
(Stedman, 1997, p. 5). Spoilers are often attempting to undermine negotiations and 
encourage the continuation of the fight. When the spoiler faction is stronger than the 
group negotiating, the conflict is not yet ripe for successful negotiation—they are at a 
point on Figure 2 where the sides’ interests in negotiating do not align. 
D. PLAN OF THE PAPER 
To explore this topic more fully, I will first describe the theory of mediators using 
their non-offensive military resources for mediation—incentive strategies—and how this 
strategy differs from the less intensive mediation strategies. Second, I will describe the 
differences between incentive and directive strategies, the components of incentive 
strategies, and what motivates a mediator to implement an incentive strategy. Third, I will 
describe incentive strategies in both its positive and negative form. Fourth, I will map an 
empirical approach to the study of incentive strategies explaining conceptualization, 
independent variables, and empirical findings, Fifth, I will use two case studies to 
demonstrate how mediators have used incentive strategies. Finally, I will reiterate the 
main findings, discuss policy implications, and highlight opportunities for future study. 
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II. INCENTIVES: AN ADDITIONAL MEDIATION STRATEGY
I use the term incentive strategy—mediation with muscle—to align with the 
language used to describe other mediation strategies. I suggest that an incentive strategy 
is the most acute form of a directive strategy and is defined by the mediator using its 
resources or leverage to advance the negotiation process (Bercovitch, 1996). I define an 
incentive strategy as when a mediator ties the use of its peacekeeping or financial assets 
to the advancement of negotiations in an external civil war conflict. Using an incentive 
strategy, a mediator voluntarily risks its own resources and reputation to overcome 
negotiation obstacles. As Figure 3 suggests, it does not simply make threats or participate 
in the negotiation process, but volunteers to accept some substantial costs to change 
warring parties’ calculations (Vasquez, Johnson, & Jaffe, 1996, p. 41; Stein, 1991). 
Mediator’s contributions to the negotiation are conditioned on changes in the combatants’ 
stances and behaviors—the application of leverage to influence the warring sides (Touval 
& Zartman, 1985, p. 12). It is worth discussing incentive strategies separately from 
directive strategies because, in an incentive strategy, a mediator has both the capability 
and the interest to make a commitment to the country in conflict, whereas some 
mediators might rely on leverage or threats within negotiations as other aspects of 
directive strategies. The two different types of incentive strategies, positive and negative, 
will be discussed separately. In short, incentive strategies are the most costly form 
of directive strategies. The different types of directive strategies and how they compare 
along a continuum of positive incentives and negative incentives are illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Spectrum of Directive Strategies 
This analysis of incentive strategies distinguishes between strategies used during 
the negotiating process—where mediators might use other aspects of directive 
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strategies—and how mediators might accept costs outside the scope of or after 
negotiations to influence the warring sides during the negotiation process. Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson, and Wille define directive strategies as when “a third party begins to affect 
the content of negotiations as well as the process. It is here that mediator influence begins 
to play a part, as he/she makes substantive suggestions and may even pressure the parties 
to accept them” (1991, p. 16). Isolating the incentive strategy aspects of directive 
strategies allows a greater degree of analytic specification than the broader category of 
directive strategies and permits the analysis of these most resource intensive mediation 
strategies. The less costly forms of directive strategies are represented toward the center 
of Figure 3 and include when the mediator might issue threats or make suggestions to 
each side. The middle strategies may appear positive or negative to the warring parties, 
but they do not require the mediator to make an actual investment in the territory’s future. 
Subsequent analysis may isolate other types of directive strategies and their impact on 
civil war conflicts and their outcomes.  
Incentive strategies (in both its positive and negative forms), on the other hand, 
represent the most significant commitments a mediator can make to a civil war 
negotiation to influence the perceptions of the warring parties. Whether the incentive 
strategy is financial, the deployment of security forces in a peacekeeping role, or the 
withdrawal of strategic assets from a territory, they are the most involved mediation 
strategies and include a greater commitment because a mediator is willingly offering and 
accepting costs that it will have to pay either during or following the conclusion of 
negotiations. Consequently, incentive strategies are most commonly associated with 
powerful mediators because they possess the resources to support any pledge. For 
example, the reputation of the United Nations (UN) enhances incentive strategies because 
it has the power and capability to improve burden sharing among members and pool 
resources to increase the magnitude of an incentive strategy offer beyond what a single, 
or even small group of nations, is able to muster (Böhmelt, 2012; Svensonn, 2006). The 
mediator’s power is relative to the civil war, its location, and scope (Hopmann, 1996). 
Additionally, incentive strategies must be well-timed to maximize their potential impact 
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at a moment of ripeness—they cannot simply be applied at any point during the actor’s 
mediation efforts (Ott, 1972). 
A. HOW MEDIATORS MIGHT USE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
Incentive strategies are most often used in parallel with other mediation strategies. 
When less costly strategies are unsuccessful, a mediator might consider supplementing its 
work in the negotiation process by using an incentive strategy. For example, when using 
an incentive strategy, a mediator still facilitates communication between the two sides or 
sets the negotiation’s agenda. As depicted in Figure 1, more costly mediation strategies 
still probably include elements of less costly strategies. A mediator could not use an 
incentive strategy without helping the warring sides understand how the incentive 
strategy changes the negotiation; an element of a facilitation strategy. An incentive 
strategy independent of other mediation strategies is more likely to fail because the 
mediator is not maximizing all the points of leverage provided by its position in the 
negotiation. Because an incentive strategy is only an offer, the mediator can withdraw it 
if, at any point, it believes the offer did not have the desired effect on the perceptions of 
the warring sides. 
B. POSITIVE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
I define a positive incentive strategy as a mediator’s willingness to commit its 
security or financial resources to an external territory in conflict to incentivize 
negotiations, overcome negotiation stalemates, or facilitate resolutions.5 A positive 
incentive strategy takes three common forms. First, a positive incentive strategy may 
include the deployment of troops or peacekeepers. For the purposes of this study, the 
mediator must promise the deployment of more than 500 troops in a peacekeeping role 
for a period lasting longer than 30 days.6 I chose these numbers because the use of 
                                                 
5 This analysis will focus on a mediator’s incentive strategy offers, not on their implementation. Future 
study might explore incentive strategy’s execution, implementation, or measure their success.  
6 I use this arbitrary cutoff because it is likely to change the warring sides’ perception of the status quo, 
whereas smaller or shorter deployments may not. Additionally, these deployments are often extended, 
proving their utility. Future study may change the number or duration of any security force to identify how 
different definitions may affect the findings. 
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peacekeepers can help prevent a recurrence of violence following settlement (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003; Fortna & Howard, 2008), and these definitions 
demonstrate a mediator’s significant commitment to prevent a recurrence of violence. 
Security may be an overwhelming concern for both warring sides, and the mediator’s 
offer to deploy a third-party force may overcome these concerns, which allows the 
negotiations to move to other issues of contention. Second, a positive incentive strategy 
might be a pledge of economic aid to help with a territory’s economic recovery or act as a 
financial incentive for the parties at war. Such an offer might help in reconstruction or be 
designated for underdeveloped areas of the territory, potentially those where the 
insurgency started or is based (Cabestan & Pavković, 2013). I use a financial 
commitment of $50 million in this study, a commitment substantial enough to have some 
sway with both sides in a conflict.7 Lastly, a positive incentive strategy might include the 
use of military force, but only if it is directly tied to the warring parties’ behavior in 
negotiations. This type of positive incentive strategy was used during the Balkans conflict 
when North Atlantic Treaty Organization mediators threatened military action if 
confronted with intransigence during negotiations (Greenhouse, 1995). In a positive 
incentive strategy, the mediator is willing to expend resources to help settle the conflict. 
In short, the mediator is adding something to the conflict to encourage negotiations. 
C. NEGATIVE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
I define a negative incentive strategy as when a mediator withdraws its resources 
from a territory in civil war.8 More specifically, a negative incentive strategy is when a 
mediator or actor pledges to cease its participation in a civil war conflict to facilitate 
negotiation. The two primary forms of negative incentive strategies are the withdrawal of 
                                                 
7 This, too, is an arbitrary cut off and, as with any security deployment, changing the level of 
commitment may change results and add to enhanced understanding of incentive strategies. 
8 I am only interested in mediators’ offers of negative incentive strategies, though mediators might 
implement negative incentive strategies simultaneous to negotiations. The promise of implementing a 
negative incentive strategy can be difficult to monitor and confirm as outside support may become hidden, 
such as the use of troops disguised in local garb or the use of different methods to transfer funds.   
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military assets deployed to a civil war (regardless of their rules of engagement)9 or 
negative financial incentives, such as an actor’s cessation of financial backing to a 
warring faction or the imposition of economic sanctions. By removing this influence, the 
mediator disrupts the status quo. The action must be connected directly to negotiations to 
be considered a negative incentive strategy, either through public statements linking the 
two, or pledges among the interested parties that their external support will cease unless 
negotiations start or advance. A mediator might use a negative incentive strategy to offset 
an outside influence that is perceived to be sustaining or worsening a civil war conflict, or 
withdraw its own support for one of the sides to improve the prospects for negotiated 
settlement. In the case of an intervening regional actor, a mediator might use its influence 
to limit that country’s activities or incentivize that country to halt its actions by granting 
it a role in negotiations. As demonstrated by Table 1, mediators have used negative 
incentive strategies 16 times since 1946, accounting for approximately one-fifth of all 
incentive strategies during that period. These strategies are probably rare because they 
often require a state or organization to sacrifice its own perceived interests for the 
betterment of the country at war, and this is unlikely to occur absent incentive to do so. 
Negative incentive strategies differ from positive incentive strategies in that such 
strategies save the mediator money or the use of resources in the short-term. 
9 Outside military forces deployed to a civil war territory are fighting primarily for the benefit of one 
side, though my definition of a negative incentive strategy was independent of the deployed force’s rules of 
engagement. 
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Table 1.   Negative Incentive Strategies since 1946 
Year Territory Government Opposition Mediators Negative Incentive 
Strategy 
1946 Iran Iran Republic of 
Azerbaijan 
Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom, United 
Nations, United States 
Soviet Union agreed 










American States, United 
States 
United States 
withdrew forces (De 
Onis, 1965; Yates, 
1988) 
1966 Arab Republic 
of Yemen 
Arab Republic of 
Yemen 
Royalists Tripartite Committee 
(Foreign Ministers from 
Iraq, Morocco, Sudan) 
Egypt withdrew forces 
and Saudis halted 
provision of arms to 
the royalists (“Yemen 
Peace Plan,” 1966) 
1967 Arab Republic 
of Yemen 
Arab Republic of 
Yemen 
Royalists Tripartite Committee 
(Foreign Ministers from 
Iraq, Morocco, Sudan) 
Egypt withdrew forces 
and Saudis halted 
provision of arms to 
the royalists (Halliday, 
2002, p. 10; Katz, 
1992) 




Organization of African 
Unity 
French and Libyan 
Forces agreed to 
withdraw (Hollick, 
1982; May & Massey, 
1998) 
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Year Territory Government Opposition Mediators Negative Incentive 
Strategy 
1989 Cambodia Cambodia CGDK Thailand, Vietnam Withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops 
(Um, 1990) 
1991 Croatia Croatia Serbian 
Republic  
European Community Sanctions threatened 
against parties who 
did not agree to 
ceasefire (Tagliabue, 
1991) 




Russia, Turkey, United 
States 
Armenia agrees to 






























United States Threat of arms 
embargo (Greenhouse, 
1995) 
1999 Congo Congo 3 Factions Multiple African Leaders Withdrawal of foreign 
forces (Smis & 
Oyatambwe, 2002) 
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Year Territory Government Opposition Mediators Negative Incentive 
Strategy 
2001 Macedonia Macedonia National 
Liberation 
Army 
European Union European Union made 
aid contingent on 
constitutional 
amendments (Ilievski 
& Talevski, 2009) 




United States United States 
threatened sanctions 
(Lacey, 2002) 
2008 Burundi Burundi National 
Liberation 
Forces 
South Africa, Tanzania Tanzania no longer 
willing to provide safe 
haven for rebels 
(Appel, 2008; 
Gettleman, 2008) 
2008 Georgia Georgia South 
Ossetia 
France, Russia Russian agrees to 
withdraw troops from 





When a negative incentive strategy removes a negotiating impediment, the offer 
might encourage warring sides to start or return to negotiations. This was the case during 
the Cambodian civil war when, in 1989, the Thai King began to mediate. Early in 1989, 
Vietnam agreed to withdraw its forces from Cambodia in exchange for renewed peace 
talks (Cima, 1990; Erlanger, 1989; Um, 1990).10 Vietnam was only willing to do so 
contingent on negotiations resuming between the Cambodian government)—Vietnam’s 
client—and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Cima, 1990; 
Um, 1990).11 
As an example of how a negative incentive strategy might be used, many scholars 
assess that the ongoing Afghan civil war cannot be solved unless Pakistan’s influence in 
the conflict is addressed (Rubin, 2007). Scholars and international officials suggest that 
Pakistan controls, and may even dictate, the Taliban’s actions (Rashid, 2008; Rubin, 
2007). Assuming this is true, Pakistan might use a negative incentive strategy whereby it 
expels Taliban leaders from its territory, or makes their residency contingent on future 
negotiations with the Afghan government. Separately, international actors may threaten 
to withdraw aid to Pakistan or make the continuation of aid conditional based on 
Pakistan’s ability to facilitate negotiations between the warring Afghan sides. 
International actors might also consider positive incentive strategies. For example, 
they might promise additional aid or the transfer of military technology to help Pakistan 
coerce the Taliban. The case of Tanzania and the Burundian civil war serves as a 
historical precedent: Tanzania’s expulsion of Burundian rebels from its territory in 2008 
was a negative incentive strategy that helped facilitate the end of the Burundi civil war 
(Gettleman, 2008). There is no assurance that these strategies would lead to negotiations 
or a settlement, but the inference that Pakistan’s support for the Taliban prolongs the war 
suggests that engaging Pakistan in the negotiation process might jumpstart more 
                                                 
10 Vietnamese troops had been stationed in Cambodia since 1970, and they withdrew in September 
1989 after the Thai King’s mediation efforts (Um, 1990). 
11 Subsequent information from both the CGDK and Thai intelligence suggests that the Vietnamese 
retained a military presence in Cambodia by disguising its soldiers as settlers and dressing their troops in 
Cambodian government uniforms (Um, 1990). Vietnam’s withdrawal did not lead to a settlement in 1989; 
the sides resolved the conflict peacefully in 1992 following additional mediation efforts. 
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productive negotiations (Laub, 2011; Waldman, 2010). I will expand on how the 
international community might use other negative and positive incentive strategies in the 
Afghan conflict in the case study section. 
D. INCENTIVE STRATEGIES’ EFFECT ON A CONFLICT 
Mediators could use an incentive strategy to change the warring sides’ 
perceptions of the status quo, thus causing them to reevaluate the costs and benefits of 
fighting vis-à-vis negotiation. By making a significant offer, the mediator might create 
what business mediation literature calls “value” for the sides to consider negotiating 
(Watkins, 2003). An incentive strategy expands the number of issues being negotiated, 
which gives the warring sides additional opportunities to realize gains from the 
negotiations (Watkins, 2003). If the sides judge that they have received value from a 
mediator’s incentive strategy offer, they might be more willing to compromise on other 
issues because the incentive strategy allows them to return to their members and 
demonstrate that they negotiated successfully—they “won” something. In short, the new 
incentive might create opportunities for compromise. For example, a mediator’s offer of 
peacekeepers might alleviate an insurgent side’s hesitancy to disarm, allowing the 
insurgent side to claim value that a third-party will ensure their safety. The mediator, by 
serving as security guarantor, meets the basic human need for security, which allows the 
negotiation to move to other issues. 
Incentive strategies are offers that change each side’s perceptions of their 
interests. The mistrust common to civil war conflicts makes each side sensitive to 
perceived slights or offenses during negotiations (Höglund & Svensson, 2006; Kelman 
1997; Stein, 1991; Walter 1999, 2002). An incentive strategy gives the warring sides an 
opportunity to save face and retain their reputation despite having to compromise during 
negotiations. They may not have anticipated the mediator’s offer before or during 
negotiations, and the incentive strategy provides rewards for continuing negotiations or 
agreeing to a settlement. Overcoming negotiating impasses builds momentum toward 
other issues being negotiated, creating a link among different aspects of the negotiation 
(Watkins, 2003). While incentive strategies probably will not be solely responsible for 
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settling a civil war, they can help overcome barriers that have contributed to a conflict’s 
intractability. By promising to take a stake in a negotiated settlement, the mediator 
changes the status quo, which is likely to prompt combatants to reconsider their stake in 
negotiations. Such an offer might increase momentum in negotiations as the creation of 
value overcomes one obstacle and provides opportunities for the sides to build trust. 
Incentive strategies may also help overcome the mistrust between the warring 
sides that might lead to breakdowns in negotiations, whether due to the activity of 
spoilers or doubt over the other side’s negotiating tactics (Greenhill & Major, 2007; 
Stedman, 1997; Walter, 1997). By creating value in new areas, mediators’ offers may 
encourage the sides to remain at the negotiating table or finalize an agreement even when 
confronted with spoiler’s obstacles. An incentive strategy gives a mediator more 
credibility and raises the stakes of negotiations—if each side views the incentive as 
valuable—because walking away risks the mediator withdrawing the offer if negotiations 
break down. This, incentive strategies can increase a negotiation’s momentum or limit the 
negative affect of spoiler activity. 
As a practical example, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have largely been at an 
impasse since 2000 despite repeated international efforts to mediate, and some have 
suggested that the two-state solution is no longer feasible (Judt, 2003; Pressman, 2003; 
Tagliabue, 2014; Zartman, 1989). The international community has served various 
mediation roles in the conflict’s negotiations: Norwegians mediated the Oslo Accords 
and the United States has been involved intermittently since the 1970s. The international 
community could use a positive incentive strategy by offering each side additional aid to 
encourage negotiations or a negative incentive strategy by threatening to withhold aid if 
the sides take actions that threaten the two-state solution. The United States, for example, 
might threaten to restrict its military aid to Israel should the country continue its 
settlement building in the West Bank or if it does not begin meaningful negotiations 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). By tying aid to negotiations, and what the international 
community hopes would be a final settlement, mediators might successfully induce and 
coerce both sides into negotiation and, eventually, settlement. While there is no guarantee 
that an incentive strategy would be successful, it demonstrates how mediators could use 
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such strategies to break an impasse in intractable conflicts, and create value by offering 
the warring sides incentive to compromise. 
E. WHY MEDIATORS USE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
Incentive strategies are used primarily by actors with significant influence in the 
conflict’s region. Actors include regional state powers, international hegemons, and both 
regional and international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). These actors have 
the necessary interest and capabilities to contribute their resources on the conflict’s 
outcome beyond the resource investments and risks to their reputation inherent in less 
intense forms of mediation.12 Why would a mediator want to make such an investment? 
A mediator might see an incentive strategy as the best option for overcoming trust 
deficits, changing the status quo of the conflict and of negotiations, or to satisfy specific 
concerns of one or both sides. For example, following the May 1999 agreement between 
the Indonesian and Portuguese governments to end the fighting in East Timor, a UN 
official said, “I think the UN presence…should serve as a reassurance to them because 
the UN cannot do anything but ensure fair play” (“East Timor Deal,” 1999).13 The UN’s 
incentive strategy overcame one of the impediments to a settlement because it ensured 
security following the settlement’s signature. Its willingness to deploy peacekeepers to 
East Timor helped the sides overcome the mutual distrust that developed during the 
conflict, and it contributed to the attainment of a peace deal.  
Mediators use incentive strategies for different reasons based on the conflict, 
actors, and the mediator’s resources. A mediator might pledge economic aid to support a 
country’s redevelopment, particularly in a country where a low Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita may have contributed to the outbreak of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 
1998). A mediator’s reasons for using an incentive strategy are probably similar to the 
reasons it initially involved itself in the conflict. A mediator uses an incentive strategy for 
five primary reasons: first, a mediator might perceive the economic, political, or 
                                                 
12 These costs might include paying for the sides to travel, hotel rooms, or other administrative costs 
associated with their facilitation. 
13 The CWM dataset categorizes the agreement between Indonesia and Portugal as a mediation event 
ending a civil war conflict. 
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humanitarian toll has become too great and determining that the conflict must be 
resolved. The cost may be in the people killed or an emerging humanitarian or refugee 
crisis. Local, regional, or international attention might pressure a mediator to “do more,” 
thereby compelling the mediator to consider increasing its commitment to the process. As 
the most costly form of mediation, an incentive strategy would demonstrate the 
mediator’s strong commitment to resolution. 
Second, a mediator might have direct interests or investments in the territory in 
conflict. In this circumstance, a mediator might determine that an incentive strategy 
would protect its interests, which might be as simple as trying to preserve an ally’s hold 
on power or as complex as protecting a way of life or system of government—such as the 
fight between capitalism and communism during the Cold War. As an example, the 
United States used a negative incentive strategy when it withdrew its troops from the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 to limit the spread of communism at the height of the Cold 
War (“Collins Criticizes Use,” 1965). 
Third, a mediator might have strategic interests in the country at war, or recognize 
that the conflict threatens its broader interests. The costs might be potential regional 
instability or threats to the global economy. For example, a civil war that threatens to 
disrupt the world’s oil or natural gas supply might prompt a mediator to use a more costly 
strategy to facilitate negotiation or a settlement to prevent the conflict from causing 
international economic damage. Affected states might also increase pressure on a 
mediator to resolve the conflict and prevent it from causing broader regional or 
international instability. 
Fourth, a mediator might seek to enhance its prestige by using an incentive 
strategy to resolve a conflict. A potential mediator might see the conflict as an 
opportunity to enhance its standing in the international community by successfully 
resolving a conflict that may have appeared intractable. Incentive strategies are 
particularly valuable tools for actors of this ilk, who may be willing to go to exceptional 
lengths to ensure success in the negotiation. Mediators may view the cost of an incentive 
strategy as worthwhile for the enhanced prestige they gain. 
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Fifth, a mediator might turn to an incentive strategy if all other mediation 
strategies have been unsuccessful and the mediator is concerned about the implications of 
the negotiation’s failure. The implications might be a return to fighting or a decline in the 
mediator’s regional or international reputation. An incentive strategy may not be the 
preferred strategy in this situation—a mediator might choose to do nothing—but an 
incentive strategy represents one of a mediator’s options if negotiations appear to be 
stalled or failing. 
F. WHEN MEDIATORS MIGHT USE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES 
Mediators will use incentive strategies when they perceive that these strategies 
will improve the chance for successful mediation. An incentive strategy’s substantial cost 
will deter a mediator from making an offer unless it believes the strategy increases the 
chance the mediator will receive a return on the investment. Not all mediators have the 
capacity to use an incentive strategy because they lack the necessary resources to make a 
meaningful offer. For a mediator to use an incentive strategy, the sides in the conflict 
must believe that the mediator has both the capability to deliver on any offer and have an 
interest in the conflict’s resolution (Kydd, 2003). Absent either capacity or capability, the 
mediator is unlikely to attempt any intercession at all, or defer to other mediation 
strategies. Figure 4 represents strategies an actor might use when electing to mediate a 
conflict. A mediator with high interest and substantial resources is represented in 
quadrant II of Figure 4. This quadrant is the only one of the four wherein a mediator 
might consider an incentive strategy. This mediator has the capacity and interest to use  
an incentive strategy, but will likely only resort to an incentive strategy in the belief  
that an incentive strategy will significantly affect the status quo and change the sides’ 






Figure 4.  Circumstances that Dictate Mediation Strategy Selection 
 
 
Quadrant IV is where a mediator possesses high interest in a conflict’s resolution, 
but has limited resources. The warring sides might not view an incentive strategy 
seriously because they would view the mediator as unable to deliver on its promises. For 
example, Turkey may want to use an incentive strategy to limit the instability caused by 
the Syrian civil war; however, it does not have the resources or cache to make a 
compelling offer. In quadrant III, a mediator does not have the interest or the resources to 
mediate a conflict and would be unlikely to intercede. Such an actor would not want to 
commit its limited resources to a conflict where it has little to gain. For example, a small 
and poor African country would not likely offer to facilitate negotiations in Southeast 
Asia, and even if it did, the warring parties in conflict would dismiss such an offer or 
view it suspiciously. In quadrant I, a mediator with substantial resources but low interest 
in a conflict is unlikely to enter the conflict as a mediator. Even if that actor offers to 
mediate, it is unlikely that the actor will agree to use an incentive strategy and devote its 
own resources to the conflict’s mediation—the potential costs would be disproportionate 
to the return the actor would receive.14 
  
                                                 
14 In all circumstances represented in Figure 4, the mediator almost assuredly would first use less 
costly mediation strategies before resorting to more costly and intensive options, which is represented by 
the phrase “or lower” in quadrants I, II, and IV. 
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
To understand whether and when a mediator might use an incentive strategy, I 
developed two standards of assessment for incentive strategies. First, I identified what 
type of mediator might use an incentive strategy in a mediation event drawing from the 
CWM dataset. I chose the CWM dataset because it is the most recent and arguably the 
most comprehensive dataset on civil war mediation. Additionally, it uses the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition of civil war, which is “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths” (Uppsala Universitet, n.d.). This definition is broader and more 
inclusive than the data that underlies other recent civil war mediation datasets (Kreutz, 
2010; Regan et al., 2009).15 To identify mediation events, the CWM uses the UCDP 
Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010), the Diplomatic Intervention and Civil War 
(Regan et al., 2009), and public sources to identify individual civil war mediation events 
(DeRouen et al., 2011). It identified 460 separate mediation cases during 1946–2004, 
while my dataset included 478 mediation events for the period 1946–2010.16 
My quantitative analysis aims to illuminate the relationship between the type of 
mediator and its use of an incentive strategy, and how various characteristics associated 
with the territory in civil war might be related to mediator’s using incentive strategies. 
The CWM dataset included the conflict, warring sides, and date of the mediation events. I 
                                                 
15 The authors of the CWM provided the author an updated version of the dataset for the research. The 
original CWM dataset can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. For more recent versions of the 
dataset, users can contact the dataset’s lead author. The UCDP/PRIO Conflict Termination dataset can be 
found at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_ dataset/. 
16 Extending the time frame from the conclusion of the CWM’s research in 2004 to 2010 accounts for 
some additional mediation events not listed in the original dataset. I also identified additional mediation 
events during the course of my research that had not been included in the CWM dataset. In this 
circumstance, I included the mediation event for the purposes of my analysis In the circumstance that the 
CWM dataset included a mediation event, but I could not find a source referring to the mediation event or 
further investigation determined the event was not, in fact, a mediation event—for instance, if two warring 
sides met without a mediator—I defaulted to coding the event as a non-incentive strategy mediation event. 
Replication data for the findings can be found by contacting the author.  
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used this data to begin my research into the identities of the mediators for each event and 
whether the mediators used an incentive strategy. I researched every event that the CWM 
coded as having included a mediation event. Recall that I define an incentive strategy as 
when the mediator’s offer includes deploying 500 peacekeepers or security forces to  
the warring country for more than 30 days, the promise of $50 million in economic aid, 
or the use of a negative incentive strategy: a pledge to remove security forces from  
a country at war or withdraw economic support. I coded the dependent variable 
dichotomously on an actor-event basis and it equaled one for any actor-event in which the 
mediator used an incentive strategy. Each actor-event represented one actor from the 
mediation event and the event that occurred. Multiple events could take place during a 
conflict, a year, or even a month. I created separate observations for each mediation event 
where the two warring sides met to discuss potentially settling its conflict with an outside 
mediator. If more than one outside actor participated in a mediation event, I coded the 
actor-event a one for the mediator that was tied to the incentive strategy. For example, in 
a mediation event that involved the African Union and Nigeria, if the African Union 
suggested a multi-national peacekeeping force under its authority, I would code it as 
using an incentive strategy. I would code Nigeria as zero because it was not responsible 
for the incentive strategy. 
In some circumstances, I was unable to determine what type of strategy the 
mediator used. If this were the case, I defaulted to coding the actor-events as a non-
incentive strategy assuming any incentive strategy would be an offer substantial enough 
to warrant publicity either during the mediation or in historical reflections on the 
mediation process. The CWM dataset included the authors’ determination of what type of 
strategy the mediator used. To ensure a consistent application of the incentive strategy 
definition throughout the research, I elected to research each mediation event 
independently to determine whether the mediator used an incentive strategy. 
Each actor-event’s observation included the actor’s name and type: IGO, non-
governmental organization (NGO), or state. Further, I separated positive and negative 
incentive strategies to permit more explicit quantitative research on the different types of 
incentive strategies, in addition to analyzing incentive strategies more broadly. I coded 
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positive and negative incentive strategies separately, but I also included a column for the 
general use of an incentive strategy. I coded a one in the incentive strategy column for 
every positive and negative incentive strategy to allow broader analysis of mediators’ use 
of incentive strategies.  
To identify whether a mediator used an incentive strategy, I examined print media 
articles around the date of the mediation event as specified in the CWM dataset. I 
examined the historical files of the New York Times and the British Broadcasting 
Company starting 10 days before the mediation event until 10 days after the event 
occurred or ended. Second, I examined the academic literature of the specific civil war—
whether books, journal articles, or NGO publications on the history or legacy of a 
conflict. Third, I used the online resources of IGOs that may have participated in any 
mediation event for any indication that, for example, the UN Security Council passed any 
resolutions regarding its involvement or planned deployment of resources. Fourth, I used 
memoirs or historical literature written by participants in the war or mediation who had 
inside knowledge of the negotiations whose reflections might provide additional insight 
into the negotiation. Lastly, I conducted a general Internet search for any resources that 
might have been excluded from my other methodologies.17 My research assumed that an 
incentive strategy offer was significant enough to merit being publicized whether at the 
time of the offer or in historical accounts of the events. Offers that have not yet been 
publicized or declassified have not been included in the dataset, though participants 
might be aware of them. 
Of the 478 mediation events examined in my dataset, mediators used incentive 
strategies in 76 mediation events. Thus, incentive strategies are relatively rare, accounting 
for only 15.9 percent of mediation events since 1946,18 probably because mediators 
explore less costly options before committing their assets and prestige. While some 
mediators might be willing to raise the stakes, others may simply prefer to abandon their 
                                                 
17 For this step, I closely scrutinized the source and its reliability before drawing any conclusions for 
my dataset. I considered print media, academic literature, NGO or IGO websites, and historical reflections 
as generally reliable.  
18 Previous scholarship suggested that directive strategies accounted for 29.6 percent of interstate 
conflict management (Gartner, 2014b).  
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role in the negotiations and walk away, rather than risk additional resources to the 
negotiation process. My quantitative analysis only examined incentive strategies as a 
subset of all mediation events, not as a subset of all civil war events. I further examined 
what type of actor offered an incentive strategy, creating separate dichotomous indicators 
for IGOs, NGOs, and states. 
B. WHAT TYPES OF MEDIATORS USE INCENTIVE STRATEGIES? 
This section examines whether a certain type of mediator is more commonly 
associated with the use of particular incentive strategies. I grouped the type of mediator 
into three categories: IGOs, NGOs, and states. I use the definition of an IGO as “entities 
created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, ongoing, 
multilateral processes of decisionmaking between states, along with the capacity to 
execute the collective will of their members (states)” (Volgy, Fausett, Grant, & Rodgers, 
2008). Put another way, IGOs are formal organizations of states that contribute people 
and money to maintain their membership. Examples of IGOs include the UN, the African 
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European 
Union, among many others. Second, NGOs are organizations that are voluntary, non-
profit distributing, formal, private, and self-governing (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). NGOs are 
distinct from IGOs because they do not represent a collection of states and may have 
niche interests, such as humanitarian or peace aims.19 NGOs do not possess the same 
resources as IGOs because membership is voluntary and they are often issue-focused. 
The Carter Center, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Human Rights Watch are 
examples of NGOs. I also included former government officials acting in an informal 
capacity as NGOs, unless they participated in negotiations as a state’s official 
representative. Lastly, states are defined as “a community which consists of a territory 
and a population subject to an organized political authority” (Organization of American 
States, n.d.). 
                                                 
19 I categorize the Roman Catholic Church as an NGO despite it possessing many of the characteristics 
of a state because it does not have the capability to annex territory as other states do. 
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This thesis used these three broad categories because each is distinct and it allows 
for a clear analytic output. Future research could dissect these categories further and 
examine traits such as how a state’s economic or political standing may affect its interest 
in mediating civil wars. NGOs are the least likely to use incentive strategies because they 
lack the capacity to implement such strategies. The strengths of NGO mediators are in 
facilitating communication and bringing sides together for talks rather than encouraging 
or coercing them toward settlement by offering to become part of any settlement. IGOs 
and states have the resources and, often, the reputations to back incentive strategy offers. 
IGOs are the most likely type of mediator to use an incentive strategy because they pool 
their members’ resources—giving them the capacity to use an incentive strategy—and 
they lack territorial ambition, increasing the likelihood that the warring sides will accept 
an IGO’s incentive strategy offer. Many of the operations these organizations implement 
are based on pooling global resources to address a humanitarian threat. States are less 
likely to shoulder the costs of an incentive strategy individually because they cannot pass 
those costs to others and would be singularly responsible, and lose prestige, if they 
withdrew resources after offering or implementing an incentive strategy. 
H1: IGOs are the mediator type most associated with the use of incentive 
strategies. 
This thesis also suggests that IGOs are more likely to be associated with positive 
incentive strategies. This type of mediation strategy allows IGO mediators to play a 
constructive role in a solution. Additionally, the presence of an IGO or its resources is 
unlikely to be an impediment to a solution, as is the case when states withdraw their 
resources as part of a negative incentive strategy. Thus, IGOs are more likely to suggest 
positive incentive strategies. These organizations probably would depart a warring 
country only because of security threats to its personnel, not as a condition of 
negotiations. 
H2: IGOs are more associated with the use of positive incentive strategies than 
negative incentive strategies. 
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C. WHAT FACTORS WITHIN THE WARRING TERRITORY SUGGEST 
AN INCENTIVE STRATEGY? 
Next, this thesis examines the circumstances within the warring country to 
identify potential conditions that might be associated with a mediator’s use of an 
incentive strategy. Two measures were used in the examination—the warring country’s 
GDP per capita and its polity score—to evaluate whether the economic or political 
circumstances within the warring country might be related to a mediator’s decision to use 
an incentive strategy.20 These measures serve as proxies to understand whether the 
warring country’s economic or political climate affect a mediator’s choice of whether  
to use an incentive strategy. These two measures are associated with conditions that  
lead to an insurgent uprising or civil war, such as poverty and political instability, among 
other factors (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & 
Holtermann, 2012). 
1. Economic Factors Influencing the Use of Incentive Strategies 
If potential mediators are aware that economic conditions are one of the drivers of 
civil war, they might be inclined to use their own economic resources to overcome the 
economic conditions that may have contributed to the conflict’s onset. Economic aid 
helps fill the gap left by the lack of foreign direct investment (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, 
& Younas, 2013). Such expenditures in a country with a lower GDP per capita would 
have a greater impact than in a country with a higher GDP per capita; a mediator’s money 
would go farther. Thus, mediators might be more inclined to use incentive strategies in 
those countries with a lower GDP per capita. 
H3: Mediators are more likely to use incentive strategies in conflicts occurring in 
countries with lower GDPs per capita. 
2. Political Factors Influencing the Use of Incentive Strategies 
Previous scholarship has argued that countries in the middle of the polity scale are 
more prone to violence than those on either end (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Muller & 
                                                 
20 This analysis used the log of the GDP per capita of data derived from the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
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Weede, 1990; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Vreeland, 2008). These studies suggest that 
“under pure dictatorship, opportunities to organize are too limited and the probability of 
successful action low” (Vreeland, 2008, p. 401). On the democracy end of the spectrum, 
the population might not need to resort to violence because “pure democracy presents the 
possibility for peaceful collective action” (Vreeland, 2008, p. 401). The polity scale calls 
those in the middle of the scale anocracies, those regimes that do not have the 
characteristics of those at either end of the scale (Gurr, Marshall, & Jaggers, 2010). I use 
the warring country’s polity score to identify if the level of democracy or autocracy is 
related to whether a mediator might use an incentive strategy. I created three categories: 
strong autocracies, anocracies, and strong democracies.21 Might a country’s polity score 
influence how a third-party actor might mediate that country’s civil war? Would powerful 
democracies, such as the United States, or large IGOs, such as the UN, use their influence 
and power to facilitate regime change and transition autocracies and anocracies toward 
democracy? Powerful mediators might use their assets in a warring country to facilitate 
the transition of that country to a democracy. 
H4: Mediators are more likely to use incentive strategies in countries that are 
anocracies or autocracies. 
How might a warring country’s polity score relate to a mediator’s decision to use 
a positive or negative incentive strategy? Mediators, particularly IGOs, are more likely to 
use positive incentive strategies in territories where they are attempting to transition the 
government to a more democratic regime probably because members of IGOs are often 
more democratic themselves (Donno, 2010; Rey & Barkdull, 2005). They may use  
the civil war and mediation as a peaceful means for facilitating regime transition and  
use their assets to encourage such a transition (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Thus, they will 
prefer that their assets be deployed to warring countries with similar regime 
characteristics. 
                                                 
21 I derived the data from the Polity IV Project. This dataset grades regime characteristics on a scale 
from -10 to 10, with 10 representing the greatest level of democracy, and -10 being the most severe 
autocracy (Gurr et al., 2010). The binary categories only examined the countries on the ends of the policy 
spectrum. I termed those countries with a polity score greater than or equal to 5 “strong democracies.” 
Similarly, I termed those countries with a polity score less than or equal to -5 “strong autocracies.” Those 
countries less than 5 but greater than -5 are anocracies. 
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H5: Mediators are more likely to use positive incentive strategies in warring 
countries with democratic regimes. 
What might explain the relationship between a mediator’s decision to use a 
negative incentive strategy and the warring country’s regime type? The military aspect of 
negative incentive strategies suggest that the warring country suffers from external 
interference in its war. Early in the Cambodian civil war, Vietnam deployed its forces to 
protect its Cambodian government clients, and protect the authoritarian regime. Is this 
conflict representative of broader trends?  
H6: Mediators are more likely to use negative incentive strategies in autocracies 
than in either anocracies or democracies. 
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IV. DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
A. INITIAL FINDINGS 
This analysis used logit regression models to test the six hypotheses because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. Table 2 is a listing of findings of the type of mediator 
most likely to use an incentive strategy and what characteristics within the warring 
country might be associated with a mediator’s use of an incentive strategy.22 Tables 3 and 
4 are representations of the findings for positive and negative incentive strategies, 
respectively. The findings in Table 2 suggest that IGOs have a statistically significant 
positive relationship with mediators’ use of incentive strategies—mediators that are IGOs 
are more likely to use incentive strategies than states or NGOs. There were no instances 
where an NGO used an incentive strategy in civil war mediation since 1946, according to 






















                                                 
22 See Appendix A for additional models. Appendix B compares the models’ predictive capacity. 
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Table 3.   Logit Model of Mediator Use of Positive Incentive Strategies 
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Table 4.   Logit Model of Mediator Use of Negative Incentive Strategies 
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B. DISCUSSION OF H1 AND H2 
The statistically significant relationship between incentive strategies and IGOs 
confirms hypothesis, H1, that IGOs are more likely to be associated with the use of 
incentive strategies. There is a strong predictive relationship between a mediator as an 
IGO and its use of an incentive strategy. This is consistent with findings from previous 
studies of IGO involvement in civil war mediation (DeRouen et al., 2011; Regan et al., 
2009). For example, Regan et al. found that different IGOs accounted for three of the top 
six actors involved in civil war mediation (2009). 
What explains the relationship between IGOs and the use of incentive strategies? 
First, as I suggested in setting up the hypothesis, IGOs overcome the burdens that might 
incline a different type of mediator to use a less intense form of mediation. IGOs 
distribute the economic and political burdens of an incentive strategy. The IGO type of 
mediator consolidates the resources of its various member states, diffusing the cost of the 
incentive strategy for each individual member and taking on the responsibility of the 
implementation and execution of the strategy. Second, IGOs insulate its contributing 
states from the potential burdens and loss of prestige if a mission is to fail. In short, IGOs 
represent a scapegoat if an incentive strategy is to fail, and the member states can more 
easily avoid blame.  
Turning to how the warring sides perceive incentive strategies from IGO 
mediators, the warring sides are probably less likely to view IGO incentive strategies as 
threatening or infringing on territories because IGOs do not have the capability to have 
territorial ambition, while states do. Mediators must ensure that warring factions do not 
construe an incentive strategy as a tool of modern imperialism. Outside military forces 
under the auspices of an IGO are restrained from taking action that the actors internal to 
the civil war conflict might see as infringing on their territory. Additionally, IGOs limit 
the power of any individual state, ensuring that the power or threat of any single state is 
balanced by the interests of the other members of the IGO. 
The end of the Cold War might also be related to the relationship between IGO 
mediators and the use of incentive strategies. In the years following the Cold War, the 
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UN expanded its role internationally. The Soviet Union’s collapse perhaps changed the 
international relations paradigm, resulting in opportunities for larger roles for IGOs, such 
as the UN. These organizations could use the end of the Cold War to “remake war-
shattered states as liberal democracies” (Huntington, 1993; Lebovic, 2004; Paris, 2003, 
pp. 449–50). IGOs played more prominent security roles that included “diplomacy, 
peacekeeping, and peacemaking, thus preventing new conflicts from taking place and 
brokering peace agreements to end those that had already erupted” (Kalyvas & Balcells, 
2010, p. 8). The UN, specifically, took on a more prominent role in the early 1990s, 
making IGO intervention in civil wars an accepted normative response to internal 
conflicts. For example, “From 1990 through 1993, the UN Security Council adopted a 
strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII…Member states thus 
endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention” expanding its 
mandate for “legitimate international intervention” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 1). This 
expanded not only the UN’s use of incentive strategies, but probably also sets a precedent 
for the UN’s regional counterparts to use similar strategies to manage regional conflicts. 
Regional organizations might have taken a more aggressive approach to intervention if 
they wanted to prevent a more aggressive UN from initiating action or operations in the 
regional organization’s area of influence. 
IGO mediators had a statistically significant relationship with the use of positive 
incentive strategies, as indicated in Table 3, confirming H2. The ability of IGOs to pool 
resources for significant investments in warring countries probably drives this statistical 
relationship. Conversely, while not statistically significant, IGOs have a negative 
relationship with the use of negative incentive strategies. This finding is intuitive based 
on Table 1, where the majority of negative incentive strategies are associated with state-
level decisions. IGOs’ perception of human protection as one of their primary missions 
(Goulding, 1993; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013), suggests they would want to 
deploy resources to a warring country, a positive incentive strategy, to help protect the 
population rather than withdraw those resources and increase the risk to the population, 
as would be the case in a negative incentive strategy. IGOs are more likely to use positive 
incentive strategies, where they can use their resources to help protect the population. 
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There are no instances where an IGO withdrew peacekeepers from a warring 
country in exchange for an agreement to continue negotiations. More likely, IGO 
withdrawals were related to an increase in violence or threat against its personnel, both 
circumstances that were independent of negotiations and not related to this investigation 
of the use of incentive strategies. Most negative incentive strategies involve an external 
state withdrawing support form one of the warring sides, or withdrawing troops from the 
country at war (see Table 1). 
C. DISCUSSION OF H3 
The relationship between mediators’ use of incentive strategies and the warring 
country’s GDP per capita in Table 2 was limited, neither confirming nor rejecting H3. 
Based on the dataset, the relationship was not strong enough to be predictive for future 
events and the coefficient’s value was near zero, suggesting that the dataset was not 
sufficient to identify a relationship between mediators’ use of incentive strategies and the 
warring country’s GDP per capita. Such a result might indicate that mediators do not 
consider the warring country’s level of economic success or failure when evaluating 
whether to use an incentive strategy. 
Despite the lack of concrete statistical findings, it is worth noting that there is 
evidence that a lower GDP per capita might be related to a mediator’s use of incentive 
strategies. First, civil wars have significant negative effects on a country’s workforce as 
the human capital in a country is enlisted to fight in the war, departs to avoid the war, is 
killed by the war, or regresses to more basic survival functions, rather than fueling 
economic output (Collier & Duponchel, 2013). Individuals that would normally be 
contributing to the territory’s economy are distracted by war and survival. This reasoning 
explains why most countries at civil war have a low GDP per capita, and it also leaves the 
hypothesis and analysis susceptible to selection effects because the lack of a strong 
economic sector may have been a contributing factor to the civil war’s start (Fearon, 
2009, pp. 292–293; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Separately, mediators might recognize that 
economic contributions are not productive in countries that lack strong governing 
institutions, and that aid contributed absent these institutions may decrease the likelihood 
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that a mediated settlement endures (Abuzeid, 2009). While mediators might want to 
provide economic aid, they are suspicious of doing so if the country does not have the 
institutional capacity to effectively use the aid. Afghanistan, for example, has been 
plagued by corruption stemming from a lack of institutional capability to manage the 
significant influx of aid since 9/11 (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). 
Mediators are more likely to use positive incentive strategies in countries with 
lower GDPs per capita, though the results in Table 3 suggest that the relationship is not 
statistically significant. The reasons offered would be consistent, though, with the 
economic aspects of negative incentive strategies, such as the use of sanctions or 
withdrawal of aid, as these have a limited effect on the poorest countries. Negative 
incentive strategies are more likely to be effective in countries with higher GDPs per 
capita where sanctions may hurt both warring sides and, perhaps, mobilize the population 
to urge each side for negotiations to alleviate or forestall sanctions. 
D. DISCUSSION OF H4, H5, AND H6 
Table 2 also suggests that the relationship between mediators’ use of incentive 
strategies and the country’s governing regime is negative—mediators are statistically less 
likely to use incentive strategies in countries that are considered strong democracies or 
strong autocracies as compared to anocracies. This confirms one aspect of H4  
that suggested incentive strategies would be used more frequently in anocracies. This 
finding might also be subject to selection effects because anocracies are the most likely 
type of regime to be in a civil war in the first place. Thus there are more opportunities  
to mediate conflicts in anocracies than on the more extreme ends of the polity scale 
(Vreeland, 2008). 
The findings for positive and negative incentive strategies are more illuminating. 
As indicated in Table 3, positive incentive strategies have a statistically significant 
negative relationship with autocracies suggesting that mediators are unwilling to consider 
deploying security forces or supplying aid to a warring country with an autocratic regime. 
Democratic regimes have a similar coefficient to the excluded category, anocracies, 
suggesting that the use of positive incentive strategies is similar for warring countries 
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with anocractic governing regimes. This partially confirms H5; mediators are more likely 
to use positive incentive strategies in democratic regimes than autocratic regimes.  
Negative incentive strategies, similarly, have a statistically significant negative 
relationship with warring countries with democratic governing regimes, suggesting that 
mediators are less likely to use their most intense forms of leverage to facilitate 
negotiations in countries with democratic regimes. The coefficient for autocratic regimes 
suggests that its relationship to negative incentive strategies is similar to that of 
anocracies. This results is only a partial confirmation of H6.  
A mediator’s use of incentive strategies based on the polity score of the country at 
civil war may warrant further study. Identifying and controlling for the polity score of the 
state mediator that uses the incentive strategy and examining the relationship with the 
warring country’s type of governing regime may provide insight into how these two 
variables interact. For example, might a democracy use an incentive strategy to defend a 
democracy? Alternatively, could a mediator use incentive strategies to facilitate a regime 
type change in a warring country? Further analysis might also examine how IGO 
mediators’ use of incentive strategies relates to the country’s polity score. These 
questions are outside the scope of this analysis but are worth further investigation. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
How does this quantitative understanding of incentive strategies translate to 
practical conflicts? Using two events from the 1990s, I will demonstrate how mediators’ 
use of an incentive strategy changed the warring parties’ calculations, leading to an 
eventual settlement. In each case, previous mediation attempts had been unsuccessful and 
the introduction of an incentive strategy influenced the warring factions. The first case is 
civil war in Sierra Leone, where the UN offered to significantly increase the number of 
troops deployed to the country to help overcome the rebel side’s security concerns. This 
case demonstrates how an IGO, the type of mediator most strongly related to the use of 
incentive strategies, used its resources to influence the warring sides and facilitate a 
negotiated settlement. The second case examines Nagorno-Karabakh, an Azeri-majority 
territory belonging to Azerbaijan but adjacent to Armenia. It sought its independence in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s after disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia 
used its regional influence to convince Armenia to withdraw its troops from the area, 
overcoming what Azerbaijan had characterized as a major obstacle to any settlement. 
This case illustrates that a mediator must have substantial resources and interest in a civil 
war to use an incentive strategy—in this case, a negative incentive strategy. Lessons from 
these and other cases can be applied to current conflicts, such as the ongoing conflict in 
Afghanistan, to enhance understanding of how an incentive strategy might improve 
prospects for negotiation. 
A. SIERRA LEONE 
The July 1999 signing of the Lomé Peace Accord between the Government of 
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) came to fruition because the 
UN’s offer to increase its presence in the country helped overcome the RUF’s security 
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concerns.23 After eight years of war, and multiple failed agreements between the two 
sides, the UN offered during the weeks leading up to the accord to expand its presence in 
Sierra Leone to up to 3,000 observers from the fewer than 200-person observer mission 
that had first deployed to the country in July 1998 (Onishi, 1999; United Nations; 2000; 
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, n.d.).24 In October, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1270 (United Nations, 1999), authorizing the deployment  
of up to 6,000 military personnel as a new United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) expanding on its earlier promise during negotiations (United Nations, 
1999).25 
Previous negotiations and agreements between the sides had been unsuccessful, 
breaking down in the days or months after their implementation. The violence eventually 
led to a major RUF offensive resulting in the group taking control of the country’s 
capital, Freetown, in early January 1999—which caused the UN observers to withdraw.26 
This point, with an ascendant insurgent actor and weakening government, typifies a 
potential “ripe” moment when one side sees itself in a strengthening position and willing 
to consider negotiation (as exhibited in Figure 2), while the previously stronger power 
sees negotiation as preferable to its potential military defeat (Mooradian & Druckman, 
1999; Zartman, 1989). In the months following the RUF’s seizure of Freetown, the 
                                                 
23 The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 and by 1999 resulted in an estimated 50,000 killed and 
over a million displaced (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The RUF began in the country’s east, but its fight 
extended to all parts of Sierra Leone shortly after its founding (Bellows & Miguel, 2006). Scholars have 
suggested that the government’s weakness and inability to provide basic services for a significant portion of 
the population led groups, such as the RUF, to organize and use violence to confront the state (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Richards, 1996). Two previous peace agreements in late 1996 and 1997—the latter included 
the initial UN deployment as part of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)—
both collapsed (United Nations, 2000). The signatories to the Lomé Peace accords, in addition to the two 
sides, included Great Britain, Nigeria, the United Nations, and the United States (Neilan, 1999). The 
Economic Community of West African States hosted the 1999 talks that led to the Lomé Peace Accords in 
Togo.  
24 UNOMSIL was authorized by U.N Security Council Resolution 1181 in July 1998 and initially 
included the deployment of 85 personnel for a period of six months (United Nations, 2000; United Nations, 
1998).  
25 UNAMSIL reached a peak of over 10,000 troops in 2001. The mission completed its mandate at the 
end of 2005 (University of Notre Dame, n.d.). 
26 The withdrawal of UNOMSIL does not constitute a negative incentive strategy because the 
withdrawal was not associated with negotiations—it was a result of security concerns—though it probably 
contributed to later calls for the resumption of negotiations. 
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United States, Great Britain, and the UN offered to host renewed talks to end the violence 
(The Sierra Leone Web, n.d.a).The negotiations, which eventually began in late May 
1999, included the discussion of what an RUF spokesperson called the “composition of a 
cease-fire monitoring team, what role that team would play, and where it would be 
deployed,” probably a reference to an expanded UN mission, to satisfy the RUF’s 
concerns (The Sierra Leone Web, n.d.b). The RUF’s willingness to highlight its security 
concerns during the discussions demonstrates the criticality of the UN’s offer to deploy a 
more substantial peacekeeping force in helping the RUF overcome its security concerns. 
Further, the sides only signed the accord after “the presidents of neighboring nations 
came to Lomé…to press both sides to end a war that neither could win outright 
militarily”—suggesting a mutually hurting stalemate (Onishi, 1999). In addition to an 
expanded UN force, the World Bank agreed to release $35 million in grants and loans to 
help rebuild infrastructure, Great Britain pledged $10 million, and the European Union 
pledged $30 million in humanitarian aid—demonstrating the mediators also used 
economic incentives to encourage the sides to reach an agreement (The Sierra Leone 
Web, n.d.b). While residual violence continued after the Lomé Peace Accord, the 
agreement represented the first step in reducing tensions between the two sides and 
rebuilding trust within the country (Bangura, 2000; Francis, 2000; Reno, 2001). 
Mediators used both aspects of a positive incentive strategy (troops and economic 
assistance) to influence the warring sides and coax them to consider both negotiation and 
settlement. Mediators made the offer at a ripe moment: when one side’s battlefield 
prospects were worsening and the other side’s prospects were improving. International 
mediators’ willingness to use a positive incentive strategy and expend their own 
resources to influence both sides led to a signed agreement settling the conflict. 
B. RUSSIA 
Russia’s use of an incentive strategy to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh civil war in 
Azerbaijan demonstrates how a negative incentive strategy changed the warring sides’ 
calculations and overcame obstacles that had stymied previous mediation attempts by 
Russia, Iran, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe starting in 1991 
(Magnusson, 2010; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
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became violent in 1988, after tensions dramatically increased at the end of 1987 (Cornell, 
1999).27 As violence escalated, Armenia deployed troops to protect ethnic Armenians 
(Magnusson, 2010). Following years of failed mediation efforts, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 
with Armenian involvement, mediated negotiations in 1994 that led to the Bishkek 
Protocol being signed on May 5, ending the civil war (Melander, 2001). During this 
round of negotiations, the Armenians agreed to the “withdrawal of troops from occupied 
territories” in reference to its soldiers that had earlier deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 1994). This was a crucial step for a settlement because the 
Azerbaijan government, upon signing the agreement, “made it clear that it did so only on 
the condition that a cease-fire would be followed by the withdrawal of Karabakh and 
Armenian forces from the districts in Azerbaijan” (Walker, 1998, p. 21). 
Russia desired a prominent role in the mediation to reassert its authority in the 
region and fend off a potential increase in American, European, or Turkish influence 
(Cornell, 1999; Kydd, 2003; Walker, 1998). It supported Armenia initially when the 
conflict became violent, but switched its support to Azerbaijan and helped train Azeri 
forces after the country agreed to full membership in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States—an organization meant to protect Russian influence in the region (Betts, 1999; 
Lynch, 2002). Additionally, Russia threatened Azerbaijan “to accept the reentry of 
Russian troops as a separation force and as border guards…If Azerbaijan does not 
comply, Russia will step up its backing for Armenia” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 
143). Russia used power tactics throughout the mediation, including a negative incentive 
strategy, to force Armenia to withdraw its troops which, along with additional coercion, 
facilitated Azerbaijan’s acceptance of the ceasefire. Russia’s use of negative incentive 
strategies helped end the conflict’s violence and furthered its interests in both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan (Kydd, 2003). Russia’s interest in reasserting its authority in the region 
                                                 
27 Conflict between the Azeri and Armenian governments over Nagorno-Karabakh began in the early 
1920s when Communist Party leaders in Moscow assigned the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to 
Azerbaijan, angering adjacent Armenia (Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). The conflict became violent in 
early 1988 as rumors of Soviet willingness to transfer the predominantly ethnic Azeri territory to Armenia 
became widespread (Cornell, 1999). The conflict became a full-fledged civil war after a December 1991 
independence referendum and the territory declaring its independence in January 1992 (Magnusson, 2010; 
Melander, 2001; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). 
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was a primary factor in its willingness to use an incentive strategy during its mediation 
efforts.  
C. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF INCENTIVE STRATEGIES TO 
AFGHANISTAN 
How can we use these conflicts to inform or predict mediator strategies for 
current conflicts? The statistical analysis and case study on Sierra Leone demonstrate that 
IGOs are the most common type of mediator to use incentive strategies. The case study 
on Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates how a mediator’s personal interests influence 
whether the mediator will be willing to accept the costs of an incentive strategy. In my 
introduction, I suggested negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan government have 
made little progress despite significant international encouragement and effort. With the 
lack of success thus far, how might the international community, as mediators, help bring 
the sides together? The considerable international investment in the conflict suggests that 
a positive incentive strategy may not be successful. The use of international troops and 
investments has, thus far, been unsuccessful in defeating the Taliban on the battlefield  
or incentivizing them to negotiate. A pledge of more troops or aid could probably  
have very little effect on the negotiations, absent a major change on the battlefield that 
might precede a ripe moment. The deployment of international troops and international 
investment was never tied to pursuing negotiations, and has primarily been geared  
toward developing the Afghan government’s capacity and defeating the Taliban. The 
international community might consider tying future deployments or contributions to 
negotiations. After nearly 15 years of conflict, it is uncertain whether more international 
investment or more security forces would incentivize a negotiated settlement. The 
significant investments made by the international community demonstrates actors’ 
significant interest in seeing the conflict resolved.  
The conflict demands a change in the status quo. Since the end of the surge in 
2012, neither side has achieved an overwhelming victory on the battlefield, nor do events 
indicate that an outright military victory is likely, suggesting the conflict has long since 
reached a mutually hurting stalemate, but that the conditions have not been ripe for 
negotiation (Nordland, 2012; Zartman, 1989). The Afghan government and Taliban will 
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eventually have to consider a negotiated settlement to end the violence that began in the 
early 1980s. The international community’s use of a negative incentive strategy might 
significantly change the status quo and encourage the sides to consider their future 
options more urgently and consider serious peace negotiations. Many other issues would 
still need to be addressed, but a withdrawal would satisfy one of the Taliban’s 
preconditions for participating in negotiations and demand they live up to that  
long-held promise. 
Perhaps the international military presence may be contributing to the lack of a 
“ripe” moment by artificially increasing both the Afghan government’s capacity and 
through its support to the Afghan security force’s operations (Peralta, 2015). The Taliban 
have been consistent in their public statements that one of their preconditions for 
negotiating with the Afghan government is the withdrawal of international forces—
which, if it occurred, could be a negative incentive strategy (Raghavan, 2015). The 
international community might consider agreeing to this demand and tying any 
withdrawal to a Taliban guarantee to limit violence (a ceasefire) and engage in 
meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government. While violence probably would 
increase in the aftermath of an international withdrawal, it might advance the conflict to a 
point where a “ripe” moment for negotiation could occur. 
Such a withdrawal would probably be exceptionally unpopular in the countries 
that have made substantial investments in Afghanistan since 2001 as part of the 
international coalition, and probably also among many Afghans. As an historical 
comparison, however, the United States’ continued funding of the South Vietnamese 
after the United States’ 1973 military withdrawal kept the South Vietnamese competitive 
with the North (Laird, 2005). Prior to the withdrawal, Henry Kissinger had negotiated an 
agreement between the North and South setting terms of outside interference in the 
country, though the Soviets quickly violated the agreement (Laird, 2005). The South did 
not collapse until that funding ceased in 1975. The example of Vietnam is instructive in 
demonstrating that financial support may be more critical to maintaining one side’s 
governing capacity. The international community might consider withdrawing its  
forces—or significantly reducing their operations—so that the Taliban and Afghan 
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government can reach a ripe moment when the two sides agree to negotiate. The 
international community’s military presence may be counteracting its efforts to 
encourage negotiations.  
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A. IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES ON CONFLICT MEDIATION 
This paper suggests that IGOs can use their resources, and those of their 
members, to incentivize warring sides in a civil war to consider negotiation and potential 
settlement. The findings in this study can help predict mediator behavior and when a 
third-party might be willing to commit its own resources to a country in conflict. 
Mediators must first have both the resources and interest in seeing a conflict resolved 
before deciding to expend their own resources in a conflict. Parties that consider 
mediating will probably use an incentive strategy only when they have something to gain 
from a successful mediation, whether it is an increase in international prestige or 
preservation of their sphere of influence. The findings fill a gap in the mediation 
literature by describing the concept of incentive strategies and developing a new dataset 
to examine which circumstances predict when a mediator will use an incentive strategy. 
This study examines the most intense and costly forms of mediation for a third-
party mediator. It further parses incentive strategies into its positive and negative forms, 
which are differentiated by whether the mediator deploys or withdraws resources, 
respectively, from a civil war territory. Positive incentive strategies include the 
deployment of troops or peacekeepers or the provision of increased aid, in exchange for 
the warring sides making progress in negotiations. IGO mediators are most strongly 
related to the use of positive incentive strategies, probably because these mediators pool 
its members resources, diffuse responsibility, and warring sides are more likely to accept 
incentive strategies from IGOs because these mediator types do not have territorial 
ambitions. Negative incentive strategies are primarily exercised by state mediators and 
are defined by the withdrawal of troops from a warring territory or the use of sanctions as 
leverage in encouraging the warring sides to negotiate. These strategies are unique 
because they are tied directly to the warring sides making progress in negotiations to 
settle their conflict, not to strengthening one side in the conflict. These concepts highlight 
other forms of leverage mediators might use in a civil war conflict to encourage 
negotiations and, eventually, settlement. Positive incentive strategies are used in almost 
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80 percent of incentive strategies, but the introduction and explanation of negative 
incentive strategies suggests additional options for third-party mediators to consider. 
Negative incentive strategies have been used by mediators in civil wars 16 times since 
1946. Understanding these two types of incentive strategies and the circumstances that 
may be associated with their use enhances the international mediation scholarship. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis examined only the occasions when mediators offered incentive 
strategies; it did not examine the degree of effectiveness of those strategies in leading to 
settlements, or improving settlement duration. Many previous studies have examined the 
effectiveness of directive strategies, and future study might examine how the focus on the 
more costly incentive strategy aspects of directive strategies affect negotiations and 
settlements, and how durable those settlements might be (Bercovitch & Lee, 2003; 
Gartner, 2014a; Gartner, 2011). Scholars might also compare positive and negative 
incentive strategies and examine whether changing the parameters of incentive 
strategies—such as adjusting the number of peacekeepers or the level of economic aid—
affects the results. These studies might also consider the use of technocrats and election 
monitors in civil war mediation and how the offer or deployment of such resources might 
affect negotiations or settlement durability (Genicot & Skaperdas, 2002). Additionally, I 
used a definition of an incentive strategy that did not consider the proportionality of the 
incentive strategy offer. For example, the peacekeepers needed for an incentive strategy 
in Papua New Guinea would not be the same as those needed for a conflict in Sudan. 
Future study might examine the use of incentive strategies proportionally to the country’s 
population or the scope of the conflict, rather than using a strict definition ignoring the 
location, population, and magnitude of the conflict. 
Why do third-parties expend their resources in another country or territory’s civil 
war? On one hand, they might be concerned about the potential spillover of the conflict 
outside the warring territory, or threat to regional stability. On the other hand, they might 
be trying to protect or expand their sphere of influence. One way to explore this dynamic 
further might be to examine the mediator’s historical investment in or relationship with 
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the warring parties, or examine the intensity of the conflict and if its lethality affected a 
mediator’s decision to use an incentive strategy. Another gap worth examining is the 
point in a conflict at which it would be best to offer an incentive strategy. Helping 
mediators understand when a ripe moment is approaching provides insight into when the 
warring sides might be most amenable to an incentive strategy and when the mediator 
might receive the greatest return for their investment based on the length or intensity of 
the conflict. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Practitioners and scholars have sought to understand more fully how to end civil 
wars by negotiation. These conflicts became common in the latter half of the 20th 
century, and are the dominant form of war early in the 21st century. This study argues 
that powerful mediators might use their resources or influence to change a civil war’s 
status quo and incentivize or coerce the warring sides to consider negotiated resolution—
what I term an incentive strategy. Incentive strategies can be either positive—where a 
mediator suggests deploying its resources to a warring territory—or negative—where the 
mediator withdraws its resources from the conflict in exchange for the warring sides 
making progress in negotiations. Mediators are most likely to use these strategies when 
they have both the resources and interests in seeing the conflict resolved. Mediators that 
are IGOs are more strongly associated with the use of incentive strategies than either state 
or NGO mediators. Finally, circumstances within the warring country, such as the 
country’s polity score, are related to a mediator’s use of incentive strategies.  
Incentive strategies are the most intense and costly strategy that mediator’s might 
use in civil war conflicts and suggest that the mediator has significant interest in 
facilitating a civil war conflict’s resolution.  
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL LOGIT MODELS OF MEDIATORS’ 
USE OF INCENTIVE STRATEGIES IN CIVIL WAR MEDIATION 
Table 5.   Additional Logit Models of Mediators’ Use of Incentive Strategies 




Table 6.   Additional Logit Models of Mediators’ Use of Positive Incentive 




Table 7.   Additional Logit Models of Mediators’ Use of Negative Incentive 
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APPENDIX B. COMPARING THE STATISTICAL MODELS USING 
RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC CURVE ANALYSIS  
Of the models analyzed, which is best for predicting a mediator’s use of an 
incentive strategy? Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis compares 
which of the models in Table 5 best discriminates between when mediators actually offer 
an incentive strategy, and when the model might falsely predict the mediator offering an 
incentive strategy. ROC analysis visualizes the performance of the binary classifier, in 
this case, whether a mediator used an incentive strategy. ROC analysis establishes the 
best decision criterion, the point when a model will capture the most “true positives” and 
minimize the capture of “false positives.”28  
ROC analysis compares models based on their sensitivity and “1-specificity.” The 
sensitivity is measured between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most sensitive. A ROC analysis 
with maximum sensitivity would capture 100 percent of the true positives, ensuring that it 
would not omit any actual outcomes. However, such an acutely sensitive test would also 
capture 100 percent of the false positives, meaning the test would provide no insight. 
Conversely, a test with a sensitivity of 0 would omit all false positives, but also omit all 
the true positives, providing no insight.  
Figure 5 compares the six models in Table 5 using ROC analysis. The ROC 
analysis demonstrates that the six models have differing predictive powers. Table 8 
includes the Area Under the Curve (AUC) values for each of the six models.29 Model 1 
had the greatest predictive power in determining whether a mediator might use an 
incentive strategy based on its AUC value. Model 2 has a similar predictive power 
suggesting that the mediator’s identity as an IGO has the greatest influence on improving 
                                                 
28 The true positive rate responds to the question of “how often did the model predict a mediator 
would use an incentive strategy when the mediator did, in fact, use an incentive strategy?” The opposite, 
false positive rate, responds to the question of “how often did the model incorrectly predict a mediator 
would use an incentive strategy when the mediator did not use an incentive strategy?” The British military 
first used ROC analysis during WWII (Swets, 1973). They sought a methodology to set the decision 
criterion that captured enemy aircraft (true positive), but did not suggest an invasion when radar merely 
detected a flock of birds (false positive). 
29 The AUC statistic is measured from .5 to 1, with .5 representing a model of no predictive value and 
1 representing a theoretically perfect model. 
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a model’s predictive power of when a mediator might use an incentive strategy. The 
AUC values for the other models are all near .5, indicating these models are limited in 
their ability to differentiate when mediators may use incentive strategies. 
Figure 5.  Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve for the Models in Table 5 
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